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MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
RAYMOND A HINTZE
 D , . _ TJ. 7 D , . v KIRK TORGENSEN 
ch,ef Deputy Protecting Utah • Protecting lou
 Chief Deputy 
August 13,2009 
Lisa Collins 
Clerk of the Court 
Utah Court of Appeals 
450 South State Street 
P.O. Box 140230 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0230 
Re: State v. Hurt, 20080662-CA 
Utah R. App. P. 240') 
Dear Ms. Collins: 
After briefing in this case, the Tenth Circuit issued significant new authority: United 
States v. McCane, F.3d , 2009 WL 2231658 (C.A. 10 (Okla.)) (attached). McCane 
supports the State's argument that even if, in hindsight, a Fourth Amendment violation 
occurred here, the exclusionary rule should not apply to non-culpable officer conduct. See, 
e.g., Br. of Aple. at 18-21 (discussing United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), Illinois 
v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340 (1987), United States v. Herring, U.S. , 129 S.Ct. 695 (2009)). 
McCane was convicted for being a felon in possession of a firearm. Id. at *2. On 
appeal, McCane challenged the seizure of a firearm during a search of his car incident to his 
arrest for a traffic offense. Id. While McCane's case was pending before the Tenth Circuit, 
the United States Supreme Court issued Arizona v. Gant, U.S. , 129 S.Ct. 1710,1714 
(2009), which limited an officer's authority to search a vehicle incident to the driver's arrest. 
The parties agreed that Gant rendered the search of McCane's car improper, but disagreed 
that suppression was the appropriate remedy. McCane, 2009 WL 2231658 at *2. The Tenth 
Circuit "agreed with the government that it would be proper . . . to apply the good-faith 
exception to a search justified under the settled case law of a United States Court of Appeals, 
but later rendered unconstitutional by a Supreme Court decision." Id. at *6. Accordingly, 
the Tenth Circuit upheld the district court's admissibility ruling under the good-faith 
exception to the Fourth Amendment. Id. 
LETTER PAGE TWO 
The Tenth Circuit's decision supports the State's position: The exclusionary rule 
should not apply to officer conduct that was lawful before Gant overturned a longstanding 
practice that was uniformly accepted in Utah and nationwide. 
This case is set for oral argument at 9:30 a.m. on Monday, 28 September 2009. 
Sincerely, 
MARIAN DECKER 
Assistant Attorney General 
copy: Dana M. Facemyer 
Westlaw 
. . . p 3d — 
... F 3d — , 2009 WL 2231658 (C A. 10 (Okla)) 
(Cite as: 2009 WL 2231658 (C.A.10 (Okla.))) 
H 
Only the Westlaw citation is currently available 
United States Court of Appeals, 
Tenth Circuit 
UNITED STATES of America Plaintiff-Appellee, 
v 
Markice Lavert McCANE Defendant-Appellant 
No. 08-6235. 
July 28, 2009 
Background: Defendant was convicted of being a 
felon m possession of a firearm after the United 
States District Court for the Western District of Ok-
lahoma, Robm J Cauthron, Chief Judge. 2008 WL 
2740926, denied his motion to suppress evidence, 
and defendant appealed 
Holdings: The Court of Appeals, Murphy, Circuit 
Judge, held that 
(1) evidence gathered m invalid search of car was 
admissible under the good-faith exception to the ex-
clusionary rule, and 
(2) e\idence was sufficient to support the convic-
tion 
Affirmed 
Tymkovich, J , filed concurring opinion 
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handcuffed and seated m the police patrol car at the 
time of the search, evidence gathered in the search 
was admissible under the good-faith exception to 
the exclusionary rule m the prosecution of the de-
fendant for being a felon m possession of a firearm, 
since the validity of the search under the Fourth 
Amendment as a search incident to arrest was sup-
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of the Circuit Court of Appeals, which was sub-
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gotten that it was there 18 U S C A § 922(g)(1) 
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sion of a firearm m a prosecution for being a felon 
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ficient to establish knowledge of and access to and 
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dominion and control over a firearm m a joint occu-
pancy case, but when combined with other evidence 
in the case linking the defendant to the firearm, 
proximity is material and probative evidence that 
may be considered m deciding whether a defendant 
had knowledge of and access to and dominion and 
control over the firearm 18 U S C A § 922(g)(1) 
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William H Campbell, Campbell Law Office, Ok-
lahoma City, OK, for Defendant-Appellant 
Edwaid J Kumiega, Assistant United States Attor-
ney (John C Richter, United States Attorney, with 
him on the bnefs), Oklahoma City, OK, for 
Plaintiff-Appellee 
Before MURPHY, ANDERSON, and 
TYMKOVICH, Circuit Judges 
MURPHY, Circuit Judge 
I. INTRODUCTION 
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*1 In April 2007, Defendant-Appellant Markice 
McCane was stopped for a suspected traffic viola-
tion by an Oklahoma City police officer After de-
termining McCane was driving under a suspended 
license, the officer arrested McCane, handcuffed 
him, and placed him in the back seat of the patrol 
car The officer then conducted a search of the pas-
senger compartment of the vehicle and discovered a 
firearm m the pocket of the driver's side door Mc-
Cane was charged with being a felon m possession 
of a firearm m violation of 18 U S C § 922(g)(1) 
McCane filed a motion to suppress the firearm as 
fruit of an unlawful search The district court 
denied the motion, concluding the search was prop-
erly undertaken as incident to a lawful arrest While 
the case was pending on appeal, the United States 
Supreme Court issued its decision in Arizona \ 
Gant, — U S — , 129 S Ct 1710, 173 L Ed 2d 485 
(2009) In Gant, the Court concluded a vehicle 
search is not valid as incident to a lawful arrest 
when a defendant is stopped fox a traffic violation 
and handcuffed m the back of the patrol car at the 
time of the search Id at 1719 In light of Gant, the 
district court erred m concluding the search was 
valid as incident to a lawful arrest Exercising juris-
diction pursuant to 28 U S C § 1291, we neverthe-
less affirm the district court's denial of the motion 
to suppress based upon the good-faith exception to 
the exclusionary rule 
n. BACKGROUND 
On April 18, 2007, Officer Aaron Ulman of the Ok-
lahoma City Police Department was patrolling his 
precinct when he observed a vehicle traveling east-
bound on a four-lane thoroughfare The vehicle was 
straddling the center line of the two eastbound 
lanes After following the vehicle for approximately 
three blocks, Officer Ulman decided to conduct a 
tiaffic stop based upon his belief the driver was vi-
olating state traffic law and his suspicion the driver 
was intoxicated After pulling the vehicle over to 
the side of the road, Officer Ulman approached the 
© 2009 Thomson Reuters/West No Claim to Ong US Gov Works 
_ F.3d — 
... F.3d — . 2009 WL 2231658 (CA.10 (Okla.)) 
(Cite as: 2009 WL 2231658 (C.A.10 (Okla.))) 
vehicle and asked the driver, later identified as Mc-
Cane, for his license and insurance information. A 
passenger, Joseph Carr, was also in the vehicle. 
After McCane informed him that his license was 
suspended, Officer Ulman asked McCane to exit 
the vehicle and accompany him to the patrol car. 
McCane complied, and Carr remained in the front 
seat of the vehicle. Upon exiting the vehicle, Mc-
Cane left the driver's door open, and the door re-
mained open for the duration of the stop. Officer 
Ulman conducted a pat-down search of McCane 
and placed him in the back seat of the patrol car. 
Officer Ulman then conducted a records check, 
which indicated McCane's license was suspended 
and the vehicle was not registered to McCane. At 
that time, Officer Ulman arrested McCane for driv-
ing with a suspended license, placed him in hand-
cuffs, and again placed him in the back seat of the 
patrol car. After requesting dispatch to contact a 
wrecker service to tow the vehicle, Officer Ulman 
asked Carr to exit the vehicle and sit in the back 
seat of the patrol car along with McCane. Carr did 
so, and Officer Ulman then searched the passenger 
compartment of the car. 
*2 During the search. Ulman discovered a .25 
caliber firearm hidden under a rag in the side pock-
et of the open door. The firearm was loaded with a 
magazine containing seven rounds of ammunition. 
Officer Ulman removed the firearm from the 
vehicle and took it back to the patrol car in order to 
secure it. The patrol car was parked directly behind 
McCane's vehicle. According to Officer Ulman, 
when McCane saw the firearm he stated, "I forgot 
that was even there,"Officer Ulman then advised 
McCane of his Miranda rights {Miranda v. Arizona, 
384 U.S. 436. 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 LJBd.2d 694 
(1966)), and McCane did not make any additional 
statements. After the vehicle was impounded, Carr 
was released, and McCane was transported to the 
police station for booking. 
McCane was charged with being a felon in posses-
Pase 5 
sion of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 
922(g)(1). Before the district court, McCane filed 
motions to suppress the firearm and exclude his al-
leged inculpatory statement. The district court 
denied these motions, concluding the statement was 
made voluntarily and the search of McCane's 
vehicle did not violate the Fourth Amendment be-
cause it was properly undertaken as a search incid-
ent to lawful arrest Following a jury trial, McCane 
was found guilty of the charged offense. McCane 
then appealed to this court alleging: (1) the district 
court erred in denying his pretrial motions to sup-
press the evidence stemming from the search of his 
vehicle; (2) insufficient evidence existed from 
which to convict him of the offense; and (3) the 
felon in possession statute at 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) 
is unconstitutional in light of the Supreme Court's 
decision in District of Columbia v. Heller, — U.S. -
—, 128 S.Ct 2783, 171 L.Ed.2d 637 (2008). 
While the case was pending before this court, the 
Supreme Court issued its decision in Arizona v. 
Gant. — U.S. — , 129 S.Ct 1710. 173 L.Ed.2d 
485.On facts almost identical to the facts of this 
case, the Supreme Court held that the search-in-
cident-to-lawful-arrest exception to the warrant re-
quirement of the Fourth Amendment is not applic-
able when a defendant has been arrested for a 
traffic violation and remains handcuffed in the back 
of a patrol car while the search is conducted. Id. at 
1719.After noting that lower courts have widely up-
held searches "in this precise factual scenario," the 
Court stated that an officer may "search a vehicle 
incident to a recent occupant's arrest only when the 
arrestee is unsecured and within reaching distance 
of the passenger compartment at the time of the 
search" or when it is "reasonable to believe evid-
ence relevant to the crime of arrest might be found 
in the vehicle." Id. at 1718-19 (quotations omitted). 
The parties agree that, in light of Gant, the district 
court erred in denying the"motion to suppress the 
firearm on the grounds that the search was proper 
as incident to lawful arrest. The parties disagree, 
© 2009 Thomson Reuters/West No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
_ F 3d — 
„ F 3d — , 2009 WL 2231658 (C A 10 (Okla)) 
(Cite as: 2009 WL 2231658 (C.A.10 (Okla.))) 
however, as to whether the district court's denial of 
the motion to suppress can be affirmed on an altern-
ative ground Thus, the issues now before the court 
are (1) whether the district court's denial of the 
motion to suppress the firearm may be affirmed 
based upon the good-faith exception to the exclu-
sionary rule or the inevitable discovery doctrine, (2) 
whether sufficient evidence existed on which to 
convict McCane, and (3) whether 18 U S C § 
922(g) is constitutional FN1 
III. DISCUSSION 
A Motion to Suppress 
*3 [1] This court may affirm the distnct court on 
any basis supported by the record Kellogg v 
Metro Life Ins Co 549 F 3d 818, 825 (10th 
Cir2008) As an alternative ground for affirming 
the district court's decision to deny the motion to 
suppress the fiiearm as fruit of an unlawful search, 
the government claims that Officer Ulman reason-
ably relied upon settled pre- Gant Tenth Circuit 
case law, and the good-faith exception to the exclu-
sionary rule should be extended to this 
search FN2To prevail on this alternative ground, 
the government must establish that the search of the 
vehicle was supported by extant Tenth Circuit pre-
cedent and that the principle of deterrence underly-
ing the exclusionary rule is not undermined 
1 Pre- Gant Tenth Circuit Precedent 
The Supreme Court m Gant expressed concern that 
its precedent, New York v Belton, 453 U S 454, 
101 S Ct 2860. 69 LEd2d 768 (1981), was being 
generally applied far beyond the underlying justi-
fications for warrantless vehicle searches incident 
to arrest of a recent occupant, l e , officer safety and 
preservation of evidence Gant 129 S Ct at 
1718-19 It observed that Be!ton"has been widely 
understood to allow a vehicle search incident to the 
arrest of a recent occupant even if there is no pos-
Page6 
sibility the arrestee could gam access to the vehicle 
at the time of the search "Id at 1718 Tenth Circuit 
precedent antecedmg Gant was not an exception 
The decision m United States v Humphrey, 208 
F 3d 1190 (10th Cir 2000), is exemplary of this cir-
cuit's precedent and is factually indistinguishable 
from the instant case In Humphrey, the defendant 
was stopped for a traffic violation, arrested on the 
basis of an outstanding warrant, and handcuffed m 
the patrol car at the time of the search of his 
vehicle See id at 1202 The defendant's arguments 
that neither officer safety nor preservation of evid-
ence were m play were to no avail Id This court 
held the search was proper "without regard to the 
fact that the search occurred after Defendant had 
been restrained and without regard to the nature of 
the offense for which he was arrested " Id (citation 
omitted) Other circuit opinions are consistent with 
Humphrey™ United States \ Brothers, 438 F 3d 
1068, 1073 (10th Cir2006) (upholding search un-
dertaken incident to lawful arrest after the defend-
ant had been restrained, but before the defendant 
was removed from the scene of the arrest) FN4, 
United States v Cotton 751 F 2d 1146, 1148-49 
(10th Cn 1985), hinted States x MiopJn, 221 
FedAppx 715, 721-22 (10th Cir2007) 
(unpublished disposition) The search in this case 
was wholly consistent with and supported by this 
court's precedent pnor to Gant 
2 Application of the Good-Faith Exception to the 
Exclusionary Rule 
[2]"The Fourth Amendment protects the right of the 
people to be secure m their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures, but contains no provision expressly pre-
cluding the use of evidence obtained m violation of 
its commands " Herring v United States, —U S -
—, 129 SCt 695, 699, 172 LEd2d 496 (2009) 
(quotations omitted) There is, however, the judi-
cially created exclusionary rule which, when ap-
© 2009 Thomson ReutersAVest No Claim to Ong US Gov Works 
~ F 3 d — 
__ F 3d — , 2009 WL 2231658 (C A 10 (Okla)) 
(Cite as: 2009 WL 2231658 (C.A.10 (Okla.))) 
plied, excludes evidence obtained m violation of 
the Fourth Amendment from being used at trial Id 
The exclusionary "rule is designed to safeguard 
Fourth Amendment rights generally through its de-
terrent effect" Id (quotation omitted) "The fact 
that a Fourth Amendment violation occurred-i e , 
that a search or arrest was unreasonable-does not 
necessarily mean that the exclusionary rule ap-
plies " Id at 700 
*4 [3][4]"The exclusionary rule is not an individual 
right and applies only where it results m appre-
ciable deterrence" Id (quotations omitted) Be-
cause the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to de-
ter police misconduct, United States \ Leon, 468 
US 897, 906, 104 S Ct 3405, 82 LEd2d 677 
(1984), in determining whether to apply the rule the 
court is to weigh the benefits of the resulting de-
terrence against the costs of applymg the rule Her-
ring, 129 S Ct at 700 "The principal cost of apply-
mg the rule is, of course, letting guilty and possibly 
dangerous defendants go free-something that of-
fends basic concepts of the criminal justice sys-
tem " Id at 701 (quotation omitted) Consequently, 
"[t]he rule's costly toll upon truth-seeking and law 
enforcement objectives presents a high obstacle for 
those urging its application" Id (quotation omit-
ted) 
Various pnnciples have been established to limit 
the application of the exclusionary rule Id at 
700 One such principle is the good-faith exception 
Id at 701 In Leon, the Supreme Court established 
the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule, 
declining to apply the exclusionary rule when po-
lice reasonably and m good faith relied upon a war-
rant subsequently declared invalid 468 U S at 922. 
104 S Ct 3405 The Court, relying on the deterrent 
purpose of the exclusionary rule, determined it was 
improper to apply the rule m this context, explain-
ing 
First, the exclusionary rule is designed to deter po-
lice misconduct rather than to punish the errors of 
Page 7 
judges and magistrates Second, there exists no 
evidence suggesting that judges and magistrates 
are inclined to ignore or subvert the Fourth 
Amendment or that lawlessness among these act-
ors requires application of the extreme sanction 
of exclusion [ ] Third, and most important, we 
discern no basis, and are offered none, for believ-
ing that exclusion of evidence seized pursuant to 
a warrant will have a significant deterrent effect 
on the issuing judge or magistrate . Judges and 
magistrates are not adjuncts to the law enforce-
ment team, as neutral judicial officers, they have 
no stake m the outcome of particular criminal 
prosecutions The threat of exclusion thus cannot 
be expected significantly to deter them 
Id at 916-17 (footnote omitted) The Court con-
cluded the exclusionary rule "cannot be expected, 
and should not be applied, to deter objectively reas-
onable lav> enforcement activlty "Id at 919 
In Illinois v Krull the Court extended the good-
faith exception to warrantless administrative 
searches performed in reliance upon a statute later 
declared unconstitutional 480 U S 340, 349-53, 
107 SCt 1160, 94 LEd2d 364 (1987) The Court 
first explained that applying the exclusionary rule 
m this situation would have little deterrent effect on 
the officer's actions, stating 
Unless a statute is clearly unconstitutional, an of-
ficer cannot be expected to question the judgment 
of the legislature that passed the law If the stat-
ute is subsequently declared unconstitutional, ex-
cluding evidence obtained pursuant to it pnor to 
such a judicial declaration will not deter future 
Fourth Amendment violations by an officer who 
has simply fulfilled his responsibility to enforce 
the statute as wntten To paraphrase the Court's 
comment m Leon Penalizing the officer for the 
legislature's error, rather than his own, cannot lo-
gically contribute to the deterrence of Fourth 
Amendment violations 
© 2009 Thomson Reuters/West No Claim to One US Gov Works 
« . F 3d — 
— F 3d — 2009 WL 2231658 (C A 10 (Okla)) 
(Cite as: 2009 WL 2231658 (C.A.10 (Okla.))) 
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*5 Id at 349-50, 107 S Ct 1160 (quotation omit-
ted) The Court then noted that the exclusionary 
rule was aimed at deterring misconduct on the part 
of police, not legislators Id at 350, 107 S Ct 
1160 To the extent consideration of the deterrent 
effect upon legislators was appropriate, however, 
the initial inquiry was whether there was "evidence 
to suggest that legislators are inclined to ignore or 
subvert the Fourth Amendment" Id (quotation 
omitted) In answering this question m the negative, 
the Court stated that, "[although legislators are not 
neutral judicial officers, as are judges and magis-
trates, neither are they adjuncts to the law enforce-
ment team " Id at 350-51, 107 S Ct 1160 (citation 
and quotation omitted) In enacting laws to carry 
out the criminal justice system, "legislators' deliber-
ations of necessity are significantly different from 
the hurried judgment of a law enforcement officer 
engaged m the often competitive enterprise of fer-
reting out crime" Id at 351. 107 S Ct 1160 
(quotation omitted) Finally, the Court noted that 
even if it were to conclude that legislators were dis-
tinguishable from officers of the judicial system, 
there was "no reason to believe that applying the 
exclusionary rule will have [a deterrent] effect Le-
gislators enact statutes for broad, programmatic 
purposes, not for the purpose of procuring evidence 
m particular criminal investigations" Id at 352, 
107 SCt 1160 
The Court next extended the good-faith exception 
to police reliance upon mistaken information m a 
court's database indicating an arrest warrant was 
outstanding Arizona v Evans 514 US 1 14-16, 
115 SCt 1185, 131 LEd2d 34 (1995) In Evam, 
the Court explained that the mistake of a judicial 
employee would not justify exclusion of evidence 
for three reasons (1) the exclusionary rule was es-
tablished to deter police misconduct, not the con-
duct of court employees, (2) there was no evidence 
court employees were likely to "ignore or subvert 
the Fourth Amendment", and (3) there was no basis 
for believing application of the exclusionary rule 
would deter the conduct at issue since "court clerks 
are not adjuncts to the law enforcement team en-
gaged m the often competitive enterprise of ferret-
ing out enme, they have no stake m the outcome of 
particular criminal prosecutions" Id at 14-15. 115 
S Ct 1185 (citation omitted) 
Finally, m its recent good-faith decision, Herring 
the Court extended the good-faith exception to po-
lice reliance upon the negligent mistake of a fellow 
law enforcement employee, as opposed to a neutral 
third party 129 SCt at 704 In Hen nig the court 
applied the good-faith exception where, m making 
an arrest, police relied upon a record-keeping error 
m the police computer database indicating there 
was an active warrant for the arrestee Id at 698, 
702-04 In discussing the principles of the exclu-
sionary rule, the Court stated that "[t]he extent to 
which the exclusionary rule is justified by [ ] de-
terrence principles vanes with the culpability of the 
law enforcement conduct" Id at 701 Thus, 
"assessment of the flagrancy of the police miscon-
duct constitutes an important step in the calculus of 
applying the exclusionary rule" Id (quotation 
omitted) 
*6 The Court went on to explain that "evidence 
should be suppressed only if it can be said that the 
law enforcement officer had knowledge, or may 
properly be charged with knowledge, that the 
search was unconstitutional under the Fourth 
Amendment" Id (quotations omitted) As such, 
"the [past] abuses that gave rise to the exclusionary 
rule featured intentional conduct that was patently 
unconstitutional" Id at 702 The Court concluded 
the conduct at issue did not rise to this level, clari-
fying that the good-faith inquiry "is confined to the 
objectively ascertainable question whether a reas-
onably well trained officer would have known that 
the search was illegal m light of all of the circum-
stances " Id at 703 (quotations omitted) 
Two inseparable principles have emerged from the 
Supreme Court cases and each builds upon the un-
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derlymg purpose of the exclusionary rule de-
terrence First, the exclusionary rule seeks to deter 
objectively unreasonable police conduct, I e , con-
duct which an officer knows or should know viol-
ates the Fourth Amendment See, eg, Hemng 129 
SCt at 701-04, Krull 480 U S at 348-49, 107 
S Ct 1160 Second, the purpose of the exclusionary 
rule is to deter misconduct by law enforcement of-
ficers, not other entities, and even if it was appro-
priate to consider the deterrent effect of the exclu-
sionary rule on other institutions, there would be no 
significant deterrent effect m excluding evidence 
based upon the mistakes of those umnvolved in or 
attenuated from law enforcement See eg, Exam 
514 U S at 14-15, 115 SCt 1185 Krull 480 US 
at 351-52, 107 SCt 1160, Leon 468 US at 
916-17, 104 SCt 3405 Based upon these prin-
ciples, we agree with the government that it would 
be proper for this court to apply the good-faith ex-
ception to a search justified under the settled case 
law of a United States Court of Appeals, but later 
rendered unconstitutional by a Supreme Court de-
cision 
Just as there is no misconduct on the part of a law 
enforcement officer who reasonably relies upon the 
mistake of a court employee m entering data, 
Evans, 514 U S at 15, 115 S Ct 1185, or the mis-
take of a legislature m passing a statute later de-
termined to be unconstitutional, Krull 480 U S at 
349-50, 107 S Ct 1160 a police officer who under-
takes a search m reasonable reliance upon the 
settled case law of a United States Court of Ap-
peals, even though the search is later deemed inval-
id by Supreme Court decision, has not engaged m 
misconduct rN4The refrain in Leon and the succes-
sion of Supreme Court good-faith cases is that the 
exclusionary rule should not be applied to 
"objectively reasonable law enforcement activity" 
486 U S at 919, 108 SCt 2218 Relying upon the 
settled case law of a United States Court of Appeals 
certainly qualifies as objectively reasonable law en-
forcement behavior 
The Supreme Court's line of good-faith cases 
clearly indicates that the reach of the exclusionary 
rule does not extend beyond police conduct to pun-
ish the mistakes of others, be they judicial officers 
or employees, or even legislators E^ans 514 US 
at 14 115 S Ct 1185 (u[T]he exclusionary rule was 
historically designed as a means of deterring police 
misconduct, not mistakes by court employees"), 
Krull 480 U S at 350, 107 S Ct 1160 ("We noted 
m Leon as an initial matter that the exclusionary 
rule was aimed at deterring police misconduct 
Thus, legislators, like judicial officers are not the 
focus of the rule "(citation omitted)), Leon 468 
US at 916, 104 SCt 3405 ("[T]he exclusionary 
rule is designed to deter police misconduct rather 
than to punish the errors of judges and magis-
trates ") In the case of judicial officers, the Su-
preme Court has stated that "there exists no evid-
ence suggesting that judges and magistrates are in-
clined to ignore or subvert the Fourth Amendment 
or that lawlessness among these actors requires ap-
plication of the extreme sanction of exclusion " Le-
on, 468 U S at 916, 104 SCt 3430 Thus there is 
no basis for believing that excluding evidence res-
ulting from an error of the court will "have a signi-
ficant deterrent effect on the issuing judge[s]" 
Id Courts are neutral arbiters charged with inter-
preting the law, and have "no stake in the outcome 
of particular criminal prosecutions " Id at 917, 104 
S Ct 3430 Consequently, excluding evidence based 
on judicial error would serve no deterrent purpose 
The Supreme Court has consistently relied upon the 
deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule m decid-
ing the scope of the good-faith exception The 
Court has declined to apply the exclusionary rule 
when no deterrent effect would result from its ap-
plication Consistent with this practice, this court 
declines to apply the exclusionary rule when law 
enforcement officers act in objectively reasonable 
reliance upon the settled case law of a United States 
Court of Appeals*™0 The good-faith exception to 
the exclusionary rule applies in this case The dis-
trict court therefore properly denied the motion to 
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suppress 
B Sufficiency of the Evidence 
*7 [5][6] This court reviews de novo the suffi-
ciency of the evidence, "ask[mg] only whether tak-
ing the evidence both direct and circumstantial, to-
gether with the reasonable inferences to be drawn 
therefrom-m the light most favorable to the govern-
ment, a reasonable jury could find the defendant 
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt" United States v 
Brown 400 F 3d 1242, 1247 (10th Cir2005) 
(quotation omitted) This court does not "assess the 
credibility of witnesses or weigh conflicting evid-
ence .. [and] may reverse only if no rational tner of 
fact could have found the essential elements of the 
crime beyond a reasonable doubt" Id (quotation 
omitted) "In order to obtain a conviction against [a 
defendant] under § 922(g), the government was re-
quired to prove that [the defendant] had previously 
been convicted of a felony, [the defendant] there-
after knowingly possessed a firearm, and such pos-
session was m or affected interstate commerce" 
United States v Michel 446 F 3d 1122, 1128 (10th 
Cir 2006) 
[7][8][9] McCane claims there was insufficient 
evidence from which the jury could find he had 
possession of the firearm Possession of a firearm 
for purposes of 18 U S C ^ 922(g)(1) can be either 
actual or constructive Id "Actual possession exists 
when a person has direct physical control over a 
firearm at a given time " United States v Jameson, 
478 F3d 1204, 1209 flOth Cir 2007) "Constructive 
possession exists when a person knowingly holds 
the power and ability to exercise dominion and con-
trol over a firearm " Id (quotation omitted) 
[10][ll]"When a defendant has exclusive posses-
sion of the premises on which a firearm is found, 
knowledge, dominion, and control can be properly 
inferred because of the exclusive possession alone " 
Id However, a[i]n cases of joint occupancy, where 
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the government seeks to prove constructive posses-
sion by circumstantial evidence, it must present 
evidence to show some connection or nexus 
between the defendant and the firearm" Michel 
446 F3d at 1128 (quotation omitted) "Proximity 
alone [ ] is insufficient to establish knowledge and 
access to (and dominion and control over) a firearm 
m a joint occupancy case " Jameson, 478 F 3d at 
1209 "But when combined with other evidence m 
the case linking the defendant to the firearm, prox-
imity is material and probative evidence that may 
be considered m deciding whether a defendant had 
knowledge of and access to (and dominion and con-
trol over) the [firearm] " Id "[A]n inference of con-
structive possession is reasonable if the conclusion 
flows from logical and probabilistic reasoning" 
Michel 446 F 3d at 1128-29 (quotation omitted) 
Officer Ulman testified that the firearm was located 
in the side pocket of the driver's door, "within 
inches of reach [of McCane] whenever the door 
[was] shut "In addition to his testimony regarding 
the proximity of the firearm to McCane, Officer Ul-
man testified that upon seeing the firearm, McCane 
stated, "I forgot that was even there "While Mc-
Cane argues Officer Ulman was not a credible wit-
ness because he was "trying to save his felony ar-
rest and obtain a conviction predicated on his ac-
tions," it was well withm the discretion of the jury 
to credit Officer Ulman's testimony and this court 
will not assess the credibility of a witness on ap-
peal United States \ Winder, 557 F 3d 1129, 1137 
(10th Cir 2009) McCane's statement, together with 
the proximity of the firearm, supports the conclu-
sion that McCane had knowledge of the firearm as 
well as the power and ability to exercise dominion 
and control over it See United States \ Hooks 551 
F3d 1205, 1213 (10th Cir 2009) (concluding de-
fendant's inculpatory statements along with other 
evidence regarding his earlier behavior and proxim-
ity to the firearm provided sufficient evidence from 
which a jury could find constructive possession of a 
firearm discovered beside a road) Thus, there exis-
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ted sufficient evidence from which the jury could 
infer McCane s constructive possession of the fire-
arm 
C The Constitutionality of 18 bSC § 922(g) 
*8 McCane first argues that m light of the Supreme 
Courts decision m Heller in which the Court held 
that the Second Amendment provides an individual 
with a right to possess and use a handgun for lawful 
purposes within the home, 128 S Ct at 2822,§ 
922(g) violates the Second Amendment The Su-
preme Court, however, explicitly stated m Hellei 
that "nothing m our opinion should be taken to cast 
doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the posses-
sion of firearms by felons" 128 S Ct at 
2%\(y-\l see also United States \ Andeison 559 
F3d 348, 352 & n 6 (5th Cn 2009) (rejecting the 
argument that $> 922(g) is unconstitutional in light 
of Heller) 
[12] McCane next argues ^ 922(g) violates the 
Commerce Clause where, as here, the crimes only 
connection to interstate commerce is the firearm's 
crossing of state lines This aigument also lacks 
merit, as it has been explicitly rejected by this 
court See eg Jjnited States \ bibano 563 F 3d 
1150, 1154 (10th Cn2009) (rejecting Commerce 
Clause challenge to § 922(g) based upon the al-
leged insufficient connection to interstate com-
merce and stating "if a firearm has traveled across 
state lines, the minimal nexus with interstate com-
merce is met and the statute can be constitutionally 
applied"), United States \ Bolton 68 F 3d 396, 400 
(10th Cn 1995) (concluding "[§ ] 922(g)'s require-
ment that the firearm have been, at some time, in 
interstate commerce is sufficient to establish its 
constitutionality under the Commerce Clause" 
(quotation omitted)) Thus, we reject each of Mc-
Cane's areuments challenging the constitutionality 
of <? 922(g) 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Pase11 
For the reasons discussed above, we affirm the de-
cision of the district courtFN8 
TYMKOVICH, J, concurring 
I join in Judge Murphy's cogent opinion, but write 
separately regarding certain issues raised by our 
Second Amendment holding 
Distnct of Columbia i Hellei instructs that it not 
be taken "to cast doubt on longstanding prohibi-
tions on the possession of firearms by felons " — 
US — 128 SCt 2783, 2816-17, 171 LEd2d 
637 (2008) This instruction, as McCane points out, 
is dictum But Supreme Court dicta binds us 
' almost as firmly as the Court s outright hold-
ings " Swefoot LC i Sine Foot Coip 531 F 3d 
1236, 1243 (10th Cir2008) (quoting Gavloi \ 
bmted States 74 F 3d 214 217 (10th Cir 1996)) 
This is particularly so where, as here, the dictum is 
recent and not enfeebled by later statements See 
id, see also Carlton F W Larson, Fow Exceptions 
in Seaich of a Theory Distnct of Columbia v 
Hellei and Judicial Ipse Dixit 60 Hastmgs L J 
1371, 1372 (2009) ('Although [ Hellei s ]Excep-
tions are arguably dicta, they are dicta of the 
strongest sort") I therefore concur with the major-
ity m rejecting McCane s Second Amendment chal-
lenge 
I write separately, though for two reasons The first 
is to note given the undeveloped history of felon 
dispossession laws the possible tension between 
Hellei s dictum and its underlying holding The 
second reason is to express concern that the dictum 
inhibits lower courts from exploring the contours of 
Hellei and its application to firearm restnctions 
*9 My first point is that the felon dispossession 
dictum may lack the "longstanding" historical basis 
that Hellei asenbes to it Indeed the scope of what 
Hellei describes as "longstanding prohibitions on 
the possession of firearms by felons," 128 S Ct at 
2816-17 is far from clear To be sure, some sources 
would support the proposition See Robert Dowlut, 
The Right to Aims Does the Constitution oi the 
© 2009 Thomson Reuters/West No Claim to One US Gov Works 
— F3d — 
„ F 3d — , 2009 WL 2231658 (C A 10 (Okla)) 
(Cite as: 2009 WL 2231658 (CA.10 (Okla.))) 
Predilection oj Judges Reign?,36 Okla LRev 65, 
96 (1983) ("Colonial and English societies of the 
eighteenth century excluded felons [from pos-
sessing firearm?]"), Don B Kates, Jr, Handgun 
Prohibition and the Original Meaning of the 
Second Amendment 82 Mich LRev 203, 266 
(1983) ("Founders [did not] consider felons withm 
the common law right to arms ") 
But more recent authorities have not found evid-
ence of longstanding dispossession laws On the 
contrary, a number have specifically argued such 
laws did not exisi and have questioned the sources 
relied upon by the earlier authorities See, e g, Lar-
son, supra, at 1374 (finding Kates's evidence of 
longstanding felon dispossession "surprisingly 
thin"), C Kevin Marshall, VITiy Can't Martha Stew-
art Have a Gun?, 32 Harv J L & Pub Pol'y 695, 
709-10, 714 (2009) (challenging the evidence cited 
by both Dowlut and Kates)rN1 Instead, they as-
sert, the weight of historical evidence suggests 
felon dispossession laws are creatures of the twenti-
eth-rather than the eighteenth-century See, eg, 
Marshall, supia at 698-713 (comprehensively re-
viewing the history of state and federal disposses-
sion laws), Larson, supra at 1374 ("[S]o far as 1 
can determine, no colonial or state law m eight-
eenth-century America formally restricted the abil-
ity of felons to own firearms "), Adam Winkler, 
Heller's Catch 22 56 UCLA LRev 1551, 1561, 
1563 (2009) (same) Together these authorities cast 
doubt on a categorical approach to felon disposses-
sion laws 
This uncertain historical evidence is problematic in 
light of Hellei 's Second Amendment interpretation 
Central to the Court's holding are a detailed textual 
analysis and a comprehensive review of the Second 
Amendment's meaning at the time of its adoption 
Heller 128 S Ct at 2788-816 Aftei conducting this 
analysis and review, Heller concludes the right "to 
keep and bear arms" is a corollary to the individual 
right of self-defense Eg, id at 2817 ("[Tjhe inher-
ent nght of self-defense has been central to the 
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Second Amendment nght") At the "core" of the 
Second Amendment nght, the Court found, is self-
defense in the home Id at 2818 
Knowing the meaning of the Second Amendment 
right and having identified its individual nature, the 
issue becomes what limits the government may 
place on the nght Indeed, this is where the Second 
Amendment rubber meets the road The restrictive 
firearm ownership and licensing laws at issue m 
Heller violated the right, the Court found Id at 
2817-21 But what about other laws7 For example, 
the broad scope of 18 US C § 922(g)(l)-which 
permanently disqualifies all felons from possessing 
firearms-would conflict with the "core" self-de-
fense right embodied in the Second Amendment 
Non-violent felons, for example, certainly have the 
same nght to self-defense m their homes as non-
felons The validity of § 922(g)(1) was not at issue 
m Hellei, so presumably the lower courts would be 
left to sort out this restnction-as well as other re-
stnctions-and to wrestle with any complexities m 
applying Hellei But the issue was not really left to 
the lower courts 
*10 In what could be descnbed as the opinion's 
deus ex machina dicta, Hellei simply declared that 
nothing in it "cast[s] doubt on longstanding prohib-
itions on the possession of firearms by felons" or 
various other gun control laws 128 S Ct at 
2816-17 And that was it These provisions, and the 
vanous regulations they encompassed, were sup-
ported without any explanation of how they would 
fare m light of the Second Amendment's ongmal 
meaning See id at 2827 (Stevens, J , dissenting), 
id at 2869-70 (Breyer, J , dissenting)™ The 
reason the Court inserted these exceptions is un-
clear Given the uncertain pedigree of felon dispos-
session laws, though, the dictum sanctioning their 
application while simultaneously sidestepping the 
Second Amendment's original meaning is odd One 
wonders, at least with regard to felon dispossession, 
whether the Hellei dictum has swallowed the 
Heller rule 
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Pase 15 
Cn 2003) In declining to extend the good-
faith rule to reliance on circuit case law, 
the court reasoned that u[s]uch expansion 
of the good-faith exception would have un-
desirable, unintended consequences, prin-
cipal among them being an implicit invita-
tion to officers m the field to engage m the 
tasks-better left to the judiciary and mem-
bers of the bar more generally-of legal re-
search and analysis" Id at 1076 In the in-
stant case, the Tenth Circuit jurisprudence 
supporting the search was settled Thus, 
there was no risk that law enforcement of-
ficers would engage in the type of complex 
legal research and analysis better left to the 
judiciary and members of the bar 
FN7 Because we uphold the search as val-
id under the good-faith doctrine, we need 
not decide whether the denial of McCane's 
motion to suppress could be affirmed 
based upon the inevitable discovery doc-
trine 
FN8 Appellant's motion to strike Ap-
pellee's Notice of Supplemental Authority 
is denied 
FN1 While Mr Kates does not address 
this e\idence specifically, he maintains 
"there is ample historical support for ex-
cluding [felons] from the right to arms 
Nations which accepted the right to arms 
invariably extended that right only to virtu-
ous citizens, and at common law felons 
were 'civilly dead,' having lost all rights 
including the nght to possess property of 
any kind "Don B Kates, A Modem His-
tonography of the Second Amendment, 56 
UCLALRev 1211, 1231 n 100(2009) 
FN2 In one sense, Heller did overturn 
Tenth Circuit case law on this issue Previ-
ously, we upheld the felon-m-possession 
statute against Second Amendment attack 
under a collective-rights theory-l e , that 
felons have no right to possess firearms 
that are not reasonably connected to milit-
ary service See, eg, United States i 
Baer, 235 F 3d 561, 564 (10th Or 2000) 
(holding that the felon-m-possession stat-
ute does not violate the Second Amend-
ment "absent evidence that [the firearms m 
question] in any way affect the mainten-
ance of a well regulated militia"), see gen-
erally David B Kopel, The Second Amend-
ment in the Tenth Circuit Thee Decades 
of (Mosth) Harmless Error %6 Dem 
ULRev 901 (2009) The Heller dictum, 
however, affirms the ultimate disposition-
l e , that the Second Amendment does not 
protect a felon's right to possess firearms 
FN3 By my count, at least six other cir-
cuits have rejected post- Heller challenges 
to the 18 U S C $ 922(g)(1) felon dispos-
session statute Almost all these decisions 
cursorily cite the Hellei dictum, and al-
most all are unpublished See, eg, Lmted 
States v Anderson 559 F 3d 348. 352 n 6 
(5th Cir2009), United States \ Brve, 318 
FedAppx 878, 879 (11th Cir200Q) 
(unpublished). Lmted States \ Frazier, 
314 FedAppx 801. 807 (6th Cir2008) 
(unpublished), United States ^ Brumon, 
292 FedAppx 259, 261 (4th Cir2008) 
(unpublished), United States v Gilbert, 
286 FedAppx 383. 386 (9th Cir2008) 
(unpublished), Lmted States x Irish, 285 
FedAppx 326, 327 (8th Cir2008) 
(unpublished) 
CA 10(Okla).2009 
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